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Outkicking the Coverage: The Unionization of 
College Athletes 
INTRODUCTION 
Few industries have experienced the growth that college football has 
sustained in recent decades.1 The athletes are bigger, the stadiums are 
cathedrals, and revenues of major college football programs have soared 
to unprecedented heights.2 This surge in popularity has induced substantial 
changes to the sport and has given rise to numerous issues that must be 
addressed if college football is to maintain its meteoric rise.3 The evolving 
role of student-athletes has created questions regarding how these 
individuals fit into the modern landscape of college football; in particular, 
the issue has arisen regarding whether athletes may be considered 
employees for the purposes of federal labor law. Recently, a group of 
scholarship football players at Northwestern University attempted to 
answer this question.4  
In January 2014, the College Athletic Players Association (“CAPA”) 
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”) to represent 
a collective bargaining unit consisting of scholarship football players at 
Northwestern University.5 In doing so, the athletes presented a novel 
question: are college athletes considered employees for purposes of federal 
labor law standards? If so, then these athletes are entitled to the rights 
prescribed to all employees under the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”), including the right to unionize and collectively bargain; if they 
are not employees, then they are excluded from coverage under the Act 
and are not entitled to any of the rights granted therein. Ultimately, the 
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 1. See Eric Chemi, The Amazing Growth in College Football Revenues, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 27, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/ 
articles/2013-09-26/the-amazing-growth-in-college-football-revenues [https://perma 
.cc/BF4H-SVYX].  
 2. See id.  
 3. See Kieran McCauley, College Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid, DAILY LOCAL 
NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.dailylocal.com/article/DL/20150428/SPORTS 
/150429826 [https://perma.cc/53FQ-5WUW].  
 4. Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats 
-football-players-trying-join-labor-union [https://perma.cc/B6UL-Y5Z4].  
 5. Id. 
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NLRB eluded the question for policy reasons.6 However, the question 
remains—what is the status of college athletes under federal labor law? 
This Comment attempts to predict the outcome of this important issue. 
Part I provides background on the administrative domain that will 
determine the status of college athletes. Discussing factors relevant to this 
determination, Part II explains the National Labor Relations Board’s prior 
decisions involving college students—specifically, graduate students 
performing teaching and research duties in return for some form of 
financial aid. Part III presents the recent petition filed by the Northwestern 
University scholarship football players and analyzes both the regional 
director’s original decision and the most recent decision issued by the 
National Labor Relations Board in August 2015. Finally, Part IV offers a 
two-pronged solution in which the NLRB would recognize scholarship 
college athletes as employees under the NLRA and subsequently establish 
a separate class of employees that retains certain rights under the Act but 
is restricted from collective bargaining.  
I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act7 on July 5, 1935, 
marking the beginning of modern federal regulation of labor relations. The 
NLRA embodies the national labor policy of the United States and 
provides the framework by which employers and employees interact, in 
the context of both union and non-union activity.  
A. Background and Purpose of the Act 
The primary function of the Act was to promote peace between labor 
and management.8 In response to instability arising from employers’ 
unwillingness to recognize certain rights of employees, Congress sought 
                                                                                                             
 6. Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-
says-northwestern-football-players-cannot-unionize.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VYJ5 
-TLF7].  
 7. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).  
 8. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 27–28 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 6th ed. 
2012) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. There is some discussion 
among commentators that the purpose of promoting industrial peace has been 
overstated by the Board and that the Act was actually meant to act as a weapon 
against the Great Depression. See, e.g., Kenneth Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An 
Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
285, 320–22 (1987). 
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to protect those rights by encouraging collective bargaining, and, further, 
to curtail certain private sector labor and management practices that were 
harmful to the national economy.9  
Relevant sections of the NLRA define and protect the rights of employers 
and employees. Section 2 provides definitions for the entire Act, including 
“employer” and “employee.”10 Section 7 expressly lists employee rights that 
are protected by the Act, and section 8 safeguards these rights by prohibiting 
“unfair labor practices” by employers.11 Finally, section 9 creates the process 
by which the National Labor Relations Board conducts representation 
proceedings.12 Any inquiry into the status of college athletes necessarily 
begins with an analysis of these sections of the NLRA. 
B. Section 2(3): Employees 
The NLRA defines “employee” broadly in section 2(3), declaring, 
“the term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited 
to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly 
states otherwise.”13 The Board generally finds little difficulty in applying 
the broad definition found in section 2(3).14 With few exceptions, if an 
individual is not in an excluded category of employees and works for an 
employer, the Board will assume that the individual is covered by the 
Act.15  
The NLRA originally did not plainly exclude independent contractors 
from coverage. However, as amended by the 1947 Labor Management 
Relations Act (the “Taft-Hartley Act”), section 2(3) provides that the term 
“employee” shall not include “any individual having the status of an 
independent contractor.”16 The Supreme Court has found that Congress’s 
purpose for excluding independent contractors was to have the Board and 
                                                                                                             
 9. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., BASIC GUIDE 
TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1 (1997). 
 10. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 11. Id. §§ 157–158.  
 12. Id. § 159.  
 13. Id. § 152(3).  
 14. Id. § 152(3) (citing as exceptions to the definition of “employee” (1) 
agricultural laborers; (2) laborers in domestic service of any family or person at 
his home; (3) individuals employed by his parent or spouse; (4) independent 
contractors; (5) supervisor; (6) individuals employed by employers subject to the 
Railway Labor Act; and (7) any individual employed by any other person who is 
not an employer as defined by the Act). 
 15. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2836. 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  
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courts apply the common law agency test in distinguishing between 
employees and independent contractors.17 
United Insurance is the preeminent guide for the Board to distinguish 
between employees and independent contractors, and recent Supreme Court 
decisions have affirmed the use of common law principles as the test for 
determining employee status.18 In NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 
the Court explained that when there is doubt as to Congress’s intended 
meaning of a term, courts should infer that Congress intended to incorporate 
the “established meaning of [the] term.”19 Thus, when Congress uses the term 
“employee” without defining it, it should be inferred that Congress meant to 
incorporate the conventional master-servant relationship set forth by common 
law agency doctrine.20 The NLRB also recognizes the application of the 
common law agency principles to the determination of employee status and 
applies the master-servant test.21 The Restatement (Second) of Agency 
defines a “servant” as “an agent employed by a master to perform service in 
his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is 
controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.”22 Therefore, 
when questions arise over the employee status of certain individuals, as in the 
case of scholarship student-athletes, the Board will analyze, among other 
factors, whether the individual performs services under the control and 
direction of the employer and whether the individual is compensated for 
these services.23 
                                                                                                             
 17. NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).  
 18. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 849 (1998); NLRB v. 
Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 89 (1995) (explaining that the determination 
as to employee status under the Act must be based on the ordinary meaning of the 
term “employee” as reflected in the common law concept of a “master-servant” 
relationship); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).  
 19. 516 U.S. at 94 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 233–23 
(quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40(1989)).  
 20. Id. The common law master-servant relationship exists when “a servant 
performs services for another, under the other’s control or right of control, and in 
return for payment.” N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206 (2000).  
 21. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 90 at *4–5, Aug. 23, 
2016 (quoting Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. at 94) (“But it is well established 
that ‘when Congress uses the term ‘employee’ in a statute that does not define the 
term, courts interpreting the statute ‘must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, 
that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning’’ of the term, with 
reference to ‘common-law agency doctrine.’”). 
 22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 23. See id.  
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C. Section 7: Rights of Employees 
The principal concern of the NLRA is the protection of employees’ 
rights, both individually and collectively.24 To effectuate this policy, 
Congress promulgated section 7, which sets forth the rights afforded to 
covered individuals.25 The Act offers protection to employees for unionized 
activities or conduct unrelated to union organizations, as well as the right to 
abstain from such activities.26 Section 7 further safeguards an employee’s 
right to self-organization and to collectively bargain with an employer.27 
The Board has interpreted these protections broadly with the understanding 
that the underlying purpose of the Act was to suppress workplace disputes 
arising from employers refusing to bargain with their employees.28  
Although security of employee rights under the NLRA is more 
commonly associated with union activity, section 7 further extends to “other 
concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection.”29 The Act lists two 
types of protected concerted activities—those engaged in for the purpose 
of collective bargaining and those engaged in for other mutual aid or 
protection.30 Thus, the protected activity must be both “concerted” in 
nature and must be aimed at either collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection. A “concerted activity” does not necessarily require direct 
group action; rather, the Board will look to the purpose and effect of the 
activity.31 For example, if an individual employee has been designated to 
act on the behalf of a group of employees, that individual is deemed to be 
engaging in concerted activities.32 Also, courts have held that the actions 
                                                                                                             
 24. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
United States . . . [to protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own 
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their 
employment or other mutual aid or protection.”).  
 25. Id. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the 
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right 
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as 
a condition of employment . . . .”). 
 26. See id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. § 151.  
 29. Id. § 157. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2836.  
 32. Id. 
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of a single employee, intended to initiate group activity, meet the 
concerted activity requirement.33  
In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
Congress intended the “mutual aid and protection” clause to broaden the 
scope of protection beyond actions associated with union activity.34 
Section 7 therefore includes concerted activities “in support of employees 
of employers other than their own,”35 and also efforts “seeking to improve 
the terms and conditions of employment or to otherwise improve their 
circumstances as employees through means other than the immediate 
employee-employer relationship.”36  
If scholarship athletes are employees under the NLRA, then they 
would be entitled to each of these rights listed in section 7, meaning that 
they would be permitted to form collective bargaining units and engage in 
non-union concerted activity for their protection. The Act empowers the 
National Labor Relations Board to resolve federal labor law disputes and 
therefore empowers the Board to determine the status of college athletes.  
D. The NLRB 
The NLRB is tasked with administering and enforcing the NLRA and 
is composed of a five-member panel,37 the General Counsel, and 33 
Regional Offices.38 The two primary functions of the Board are remedying 
unfair labor practices, as defined by the Act, and conducting representation 
proceedings to determine the status of labor organizations.39 
1. Authority of the NLRB 
Fundamentally, the NLRB is an administrative agency that obtains its 
authority from Congress through the NLRA.40 Congress’s power to 
regulate labor-management relations is limited by the Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution, which restricts Congressional regulation to enterprises 
                                                                                                             
 33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Caval Tool Div., Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 262 
F.3d 184, 186 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 34. Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978). 
 35. Id. at 564; see, e.g., NLRB v. J.G. Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1943) 
(finding a right to express sympathy for striking employees of another employer). 
 36. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565. 
 37. Board Members are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate 
for five-year terms. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2824–25. 
 38. BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 9, at 33. 
 39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(b)–(c), 160(a) (2012). 
 40. Id. § 153.  
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whose operations affect commerce.41 Therefore, the Board’s authority is 
limited to cases in which an employer’s operations “affect commerce.”42  
The NLRB’s authority extends only to “employers” under the Act, and 
section 2(2), which defines the term “employer,” excludes “the United 
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal 
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof.”43 Therefore, 
publicly owned state colleges and universities are not subject to the 
Board’s authority. Rather, only private institutions, like Northwestern 
University, are governed by the NLRA.44 
Every case before the NLRB begins in the regional offices, either with 
the filing of petitions in representation cases or through charges brought 
against an employer in unfair labor practice cases.45 Each regional office 
is under the immediate direction of a regional director that investigates all 
petitions and charges, conducts representation hearings and elections, and 
prosecutes unfair labor practice cases.46 Through this procedure, the 
Northwestern football players began their effort toward unionization by 
filing a representation petition with the regional director’s office in 
Chicago.47 
2. Representation Procedure 
The Board has delegated its authority in all representation matters to 
its regional directors.48 Section 9(c) of the Act outlines the procedure for 
representation cases, which begins with the filing of a petition in the 
appropriate regional office.49 Once the petition is filed, the regional staff 
conducts investigation proceedings to gauge the viability of the individuals’ 
                                                                                                             
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 42. BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 9, at 
33. “Commerce” is understood to include “trade, traffic, transportation, or 
communication within the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United 
States; or between any State or Territory and any other State, Territory, or the 
District of Columbia; or between two points in the same state, but through any 
other State, Territory, the District of Columbia, or a foreign country.” Id. 
 43. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). 
 44. Id.  
 45. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2830. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
167 (Aug. 17, 2015).  
 48. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2841.  
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).  
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claim.50 Following the investigation and formal representation hearing, the 
hearing officer submits a report to the regional director summarizing the 
issues of the case without making any recommendations.51 The final decision 
by the regional director includes a finding of facts, the conclusions of law, 
and either a direction of election or an order dismissing the petition.52 In 
any case in which the regional director issues a ruling, any party may file 
a request for the Board to review that decision.53 The NLRB has reviewed 
the status of numerous potential bargaining units through this procedure, 
including those composed of certain types of graduate students, which 
could be analogized to any potential group of college athletes.54  
II. EARLY NLRB DECISIONS 
The National Labor Relations Board recognized that the Northwestern 
football team’s petition presented an issue of first impression, in that the 
Board had never been asked to determine the status of college athletes 
under the NLRA.55 However, the Board has often been called upon to 
determine the status of other types of students in the academic arena.56 
Graduate students frequently perform teaching functions, generally under 
the direct supervision of faculty members, while receiving financial 
assistance to attend the university—thus, these graduate students would 
presumably meet the common law master-servant test for employees.57 
Nevertheless, for many years, the Board found graduate assistants to be 
“primarily students” and thus excluded from coverage under the Act.58 
Then, in 2000, faced with a petition by graduate students at New York 
                                                                                                             
 50. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2836. Specifically, the 
staff will determine whether the Board has jurisdiction, whether there is a 
sufficient showing of interest, whether there exist statutory or policy reasons for 
precluding an election, and will establish the scope and composition of the 
collective bargaining unit. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2840.  
 52. 29 C.F.R. §102.67(a)–(b) (2016).  
 53. Id. 
 54. See infra Part II. 
 55. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
167 (Aug. 17, 2015).  
 56. See, e.g., Trustees of Columbia Univ., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 
2016); see also Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004); N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 
1205 (2000); The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974); 
Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972). 
 57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).  
 58. See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 640; see also The Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. at 623. 
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University, the Board reconsidered its position and held that certain 
graduate students were employees under section 2(3).59 The Board 
subsequently returned to its original stance and determined that graduate 
assistants were not employees within the meaning of the Act.60 Recently, 
the Board returned to its reasoning in New York University61 and applied the 
master-servant test to a group of graduate students from Columbia 
University.62 The Board ultimately determined that the students were 
employees under the NLRA.63 Thus, as it stands, graduate students at private 
universities are covered by the NLRA and are able to avail themselves of 
the rights granted therein. Were the Board to deliberate on the status of 
college athletes under the Act, it would likely incorporate, or at least 
consider, its reasoning in the graduate student cases. A survey of the Board’s 
line of graduate student decisions may reveal how the Board would 
determine the status of college athletes under the Act. 
A. Pre-New York University Decisions 
If an individual is not excluded by section 2(3), then the individual is 
assumed to be an employee. Therefore, under this rule, the Board does not 
ordinarily face much difficulty in determining whether an individual is an 
“employee” under the Act.64 However, the Board has excluded certain 
categories of individuals not expressly listed in section 2(3).65 In a line of 
decisions beginning in the 1970s, the Board held that graduate students 
working in teaching positions are not employees and therefore cannot be 
included in a bargaining unit because their inclusion would go against the 
purposes of the Act.66  
In Adelphi University, the Board excluded graduate student assistants 
from a unit of regular faculty members, finding that the graduate assistants 
                                                                                                             
 59. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1206 (reasoning that graduate students are 
employees, despite also being students, because they are paid to perform services 
under the direction of faculty supervisors). 
 60. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 490 (holding that the imposition of collective 
bargaining on graduate students would intrude on the educational processes and that 
policy reasons called for excluding the students from coverage).  
 61. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205.  
 62. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 63. Id. at *12–13. 
 64. Id. at *4.  
 65. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487–88.  
 66. See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972); see also The 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974). 
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were “primarily students.”67 The Board emphasized that the students’ 
employment was entirely dependent on their working toward academic 
degrees and that they were under the supervision of regular faculty 
members.68 The Board, however, did not determine whether the graduate 
students were “employees” as defined by the Act and correspondingly 
whether they had the right to collectively bargain.69 Rather, it found that 
because the individuals were primarily students, they did not enjoy a 
“community of interest” with the faculty sufficient to warrant inclusion in 
the bargaining unit consisting solely of regular faculty members.70 Two 
years after Adelphi, the Board took the next step and held that graduate 
research assistants were not employees within the meaning of section 2(3) 
because they were “primarily students.”71  
The Board reiterated its position on students performing services directly 
related to an educational program when faced with the status of medical 
interns, residents, and fellows obtaining medical degrees.72 In St. Clare’s 
Hospital, the Board cited its earlier graduate student cases as denying them 
the right to be represented separately.73 The Board emphasized that the 
individuals served primarily as students rather than as employees of the 
teaching hospital.74 The “mutual interest” of the students and the educational 
institution in the service was predominantly educational, rather than 
economic, making them primarily students and, therefore, outside of the 
coverage of the NLRA.75  
In Boston Medical Center, the Board overruled Cedars-Sinai and St. 
Clare’s and held that medical students performing services in a hospital were 
employees within section 2(3).76 The Board interpreted the breadth of section 
                                                                                                             
 67. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 640. 
 68. Id.  
 69. See id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. at 621–23 (specifying 
various factors to show that the individuals were primarily students, including (1) 
the research assistants were graduate students enrolled as Ph.D. candidates at the 
university; (2) the research assistants were required to perform research to obtain 
their degree; (3) the research assistants received academic credit for their work; 
and (4) the stipend was actually financial aid that was not dependent on the nature 
or value of their services or the individual skill of the recipients). 
 72. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976); St. Clare’s Hosp. 
and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977) (attempting to better explain the 
Board’s decision in Cedars-Sinai).  
 73. St. Clare’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Bos. Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 168 (1999).  
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2(3) expansively and the list of exclusions narrowly—meaning that the 
medical students were within the meaning of “employee” unless there 
existed some statutory or policy reasons for exclusion.77 However, the 
Board did not address the status of graduate assistants who had not yet 
received academic degrees, meaning that Boston Medical did not overturn 
the Board’s decisions in Adelphi and Leland Stanford.78  
The decision in Boston Medical, although not binding on graduate 
students, raised the question of whether graduate students were also 
employees based on similar reasoning. In 2000, the Board revisited the 
status of graduate students under the NLRA and in doing so, imposed 
dramatic changes to federal labor law.79  
B. New York University 
In New York University, the Board shifted its stance on graduate 
students, declaring that graduate assistants from New York University 
(“NYU”) were employees and therefore were entitled to organize and 
bargain with the university, despite also being enrolled as students.80 
Relying on similar reasoning as in Boston Medical Center, the Board 
rejected the argument that the graduate students were precluded from 
coverage simply because they were students.81 The Board recognized that 
the term “employee,” as it is used in section 2(3), incorporates common 
law agency doctrine.82 Because the graduate students worked as teachers 
and researchers under the control of the department administrators, and 
were paid for their work, they were clearly employees under the common 
law and section 2(3) of the Act.83  
First, the Board rejected NYU’s position that the case was 
distinguishable from Boston Medical Center.84 The Board also disagreed 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. at 160.  
 78. Id. 
 79. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 (2000). 
 80. Id. at 1209.  
 81. See id. at 1205 (“We reject the contention . . . that, because the graduate 
assistants may be ‘predominantly students,’ they cannot be statutory employees. . . . 
[W]e find there is no basis to deny collective-bargaining rights to statutory employees 
merely because they are employed by an educational institution in which they are 
enrolled as students.”). 
 82. See id. at 1205–06 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 
85, 93–95 (1995)). 
 83. See id. at 1206. 
 84. See id. at 1206–07. The university argued that the students differed from 
the medical students in three ways: (1) the housestaff in Boston Medical spent 
80% of their time providing services for the hospital, compared to the graduate 
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that the amount of time spent working was relevant to the determination 
that an individual is covered under the Act, citing previous decisions in 
which it had found that part-time faculty constituted an appropriate 
bargaining unit.85 Next, the Board confirmed that the graduate students 
were compensated for their work.86 The fact that the students did not 
receive any academic credit for their work underlined the notion that they 
were performing services in exchange for pay.87 Finally, the Board 
disposed of the argument that the students were performing services in 
furtherance of their degree, again emphasizing that the duties performed 
were not rendered as a requirement for obtaining their degree.88  
NYU alternatively argued that policy reasons required the Board to 
exclude the students from coverage under the Act even if the graduate 
students were statutory employees.89 In response, the Board compared the 
relationship between the graduate students and the university to the 
unquestionably economic relationship between the faculty and the 
university.90 The Board cited its longstanding practice of approving units 
composed of faculty members at private colleges and universities, without 
fear of infringing on academic freedom.91  
The Board stressed that its historic interpretation of the Act rejected a 
narrow reading that bars individuals from coverage simply because they 
are simultaneously enrolled as students.92 The graduate students satisfied 
                                                                                                             
students spending only 15% of their time performing teaching and research duties 
for the university; (2) the graduate students received financial aid, rather than 
compensation, for their services, unlike the housestaff; and (3) the graduate 
students performed their duties as a step toward obtaining their degree, while the 
housestaff already had their degrees. Id.  
 85. See id. at 1206 (citing Univ. of S.F., 265 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1982)). 
 86. See id. at 1206–07. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1207 (“[I]t is undisputed that working as a graduate assistant is not a 
requirement for obtaining a graduate degree in most departments. Nor is it part of 
the graduate student curriculum in most departments. Therefore, notwithstanding 
any educational benefit derived from graduate assistants’ employment, we reject the 
premise of the Employer’s argument that graduate assistants should be denied 
collective-bargaining rights because their work is primarily educational.”). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 1208 (“Indeed in some respects the graduate assistants’ working 
conditions are no different from those of the Employer’s regular faculty.”). 
 91. Id. (“After nearly 30 years of experience with bargaining units of faculty 
members, we are confident that in bargaining concerning units of graduate 
students, the parties can ‘confront any issues of academic freedom as they would 
any other issue in collective bargaining.’”). 
 92. See id. at 1209.  
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the common law master-servant test and were therefore entitled to the 
rights enumerated in the Act.93 Under cases such as Adelphi University and 
Leland Stanford, graduate students were excluded from coverage under 
the National Labor Relations Act.94 After New York University, graduate 
students were recognized as employees and therefore granted section 7 
rights provided to all employees, marking a major shift in employees’ 
rights under the Act.95 
C. Brown University 
Four years after New York University, the Board was again presented 
with a question regarding the status of graduate students.96 In a three to 
two decision, the Board overturned New York University, concluding that 
it had been decided incorrectly and returning to its previous rule of 
excluding graduate students from the Act.97 The policy reasons cited by 
the majority opinion provide some insight into the Board’s interpretation 
of the scope of the NLRA. 
1. Majority Opinion 
The Board’s decision in Brown advocated consistency with the overall 
purpose of the NLRA—to reduce industrial strife and unrest resulting from 
an inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees.98 
The fundamental premise of the Act envisioned an economic relationship 
between the opposing parties, which is why the Board had historically 
declined to assert jurisdiction over relationships that were “primarily 
educational.”99 
The majority considered the graduate students’ relationship with the 
university and determined that they were primarily students because the 
bulk of their time was committed to obtaining a degree and their service 
as graduate assistants was part of their degree requirement.100 The fact that 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id.  
 94. See supra Part II.A.  
 95. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205. 
 96. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004). 
 97. See id. at 483 (“[NYU] reversed more than 25 years of Board precedent. 
That precedent was never successfully challenged in court or in Congress. In our 
decision today, we return to the Board’s pre-NYU precedent that graduate students 
are not statutory employees.”). 
 98. See id. at 487–88. 
 99. See id. at 488.  
 100. Id.  
598 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
their status as graduate assistants was contingent on their enrollment as 
students further convinced the Board members that the overall relationship 
between the graduate assistants and the university was primarily educational 
rather than economic.101 
In contrasting the student-teacher relationship with the employer-
employee relationship, the Board contended that the Act was not meant to 
cover relationships between the students and the university.102 In the 
majority’s opinion, applying the collective bargaining process to educational 
decisions “would be of ‘dubious value’ because educational concerns are 
largely irrelevant to wages, hours, and working conditions.”103 The Board 
further distinguished the personal nature of the educational process, in which 
students work individually with teachers on a daily basis, from collective 
bargaining, which is predicated on the collective treatment of represented 
individuals.104  
For these reasons the Board concluded that the collective bargaining 
process would have a detrimental effect on the educational process, which is 
why predominantly educational relationships were traditionally not covered 
by the Act.105 The Board reverted to its longstanding precedent that graduate 
students are outside the definition of “employee” under the NLRA.106 
2. Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting members argued that the Board should continue to 
apply common law agency principles to determine that graduate students 
are employees within the meaning of section 2(3).107 The dissent’s 
reasoning, which was recently relied upon by the Board to overturn Brown, 
provides insight into how the Board characterizes graduate students, and 
potentially college athletes, today.  
The dissenting members found two major flaws in the majority’s 
conclusion that the Act could not be “imposed blindly on the academic 
world.”108 First, the majority failed to acknowledge the statutory principles 
that governed the case, namely, the plain, expansive language of section 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. at 489. 
 102. See id.  
 103. Id. (citing St. Clare’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977)). 
 104. See id. at 489–90. 
 105. Id. at 493. 
 106. See id.  
 107. See id. (anticipating scenarios where students are bargaining with their 
teachers over how many tests to administer per semester, for example).  
 108. Id. at 494. 
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2(3).109 The dissent cited New York University for the proposition that the 
Board must give effect to the plain meaning of the language in section 2(3) 
and apply the master-servant test to the graduate students.110 According to 
the dissent, the majority’s decision effectively excluded individuals who 
meet the statutory definition of employees.111 Second, the majority rested 
its decision on “fundamental misunderstandings of contemporary higher 
education” that minimized the economic relationship between the graduate 
students and Brown.112 Given the evolving nature of universities, which 
has become a workplace for many, including students, the dissent 
maintained that the policies of the Act should apply to the academic setting 
as well.113  
In sum, the dissent claimed that the Board had overstepped its 
authority by ignoring the broad statutory language of the Act and had 
overruled New York University without any valid rationale for doing so.114 
The issues that brought the graduate students before the Board did not fade 
and were again addressed by the Board in 2016.115 
D. Still Up for Debate 
If Heisman Trophy-winning running back Herschel Walker and the 
National Labor Relations Board have one thing in common, it is the ability 
to keep the public on its toes.116 Throughout his career, Walker bewildered 
defenses by shifting and spinning his way into the end zone.117 The Board 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. at 494–95. 
 110. Id. at 495 (citing N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000)).  
 111. Id. at 495–96. 
 112. Id. at 494, 497. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 500. 
 115. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 116. See Michael Luck, Happier Times: When the Dogs Had Herschel Walker, 
DAWGNATION.COM, https://www.dawgnation.com/football/happier-times-when-the-
dogs-had-herschel-walker [https://perma.cc/ZVP2-7Y2S] (last visited Sept. 5, 2016); 
see also Scott Jaschik, NLRB Returns to Grad Student Unions, INSIDEHIGHERED.COM 
(Oct. 23, 2015, 10:17 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/10/23/nlrb-
returns-issue-graduate-student-unions-private-institutions [https://perma.cc/9LFX-M 
DUG]. 
 117. Herschel Walker won the 1982 Heisman Trophy, which is awarded to the top 
college football player in the country. In his college and professional career, Walker 
totaled 113 touchdowns. See Herschel Walker, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 
http://www.nfl.com/player/herschelwalker/2503506/careerstats [https://perma.cc/CDN 
6-XQ52] (last visited Sept. 5, 2016); Herschel Walker, SPORTS-REFERENCE.COM, 
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has displayed similar light-footedness when it comes to establishing the 
status of graduate students under the NLRA. In 2016, the Board revisited 
Brown University and ultimately overruled the decision, holding that 
graduate students “who have a common-law employment relationship 
with their university are statutory employees under the Act.”118 
Relying largely on the dissenting members’ reasoning in Brown 
University, the Board found that the Brown University Board had erred by 
determining that graduate students could not be treated as employees.119 
Rather, given the breadth of section 2(3), students could be employees of 
a university while also being students.120 In fact, the absence of graduate 
students from the excluded categories of individuals was a strong 
indication of coverage.121 The Board rejected the claim in Brown 
University that finding graduate students to be statutory employees is 
incompatible with the “underlying fundamental premise of the Act” and 
held that, where an employment relationship exists, there should be 
compelling reasons for excluding a group of workers from coverage.122 In 
this regard, the Board noted that the extent of the economic aspect of an 
employment relationship has always been “the payment of tangible 
compensation.”123 Accordingly, the Columbia University Board overruled 
Brown University and held that graduate students are entitled to the full 
panoply of section 7 rights granted to employees when there exists a 
common law employment relationship between the students and their 
university.124  
                                                                                                             
http://www.sports-reference.com/cfb/players/herschel-walker-1.html [https://perma.cc 
/U557-8PNX] (last visited Sept. 5, 2016).  
 118. Brown Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *2 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 119. Id. (“Where student assistants have an employment relationship with their 
university under the common law test [...] this relationship is sufficient to establish 
that the student assistant is a Section 2(3) employee for all statutory purposes.”).  
 120. Id. (citing Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995)) (“The 
‘phrasing of the Act,’ as the Court has pointed out, ‘seems to reiterate the breadth 
of the ordinary dictionary definition’ of the term, a definition that ‘includes any 
person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation.’”). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at *5 (“The Act is designed to cover a particular type of ‘economic 
relationship’ – an employment relationship – and where that relationship exists, 
there should be compelling reasons before the Board excludes a category of 
workers from the Act’s coverage.”).  
 123. Id. at *6 (“Even when such an economic component may seem 
comparatively slight, relative to other aspects of the relationship between worker 
and employer, the payment of compensation, in conjunction with the employer’s 
control, suffices to establish an employment relationship for purposes of the Act.”).  
 124. Id. at 13.  
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In assessing the Northwestern players’ representation petition, the 
NLRB specifically addressed the similarities and differences between the 
claims made by the athletes and those previously set forth by the graduate 
students.125 Although the Board’s decisions regarding graduate students 
are not perfectly applicable to scholarship athletes, the decisions provide 
some insight into the Board’s reasoning and motivation for determining 
whether certain individuals are, or are not, employees under the Act.  
III. NORTHWESTERN TACKLES THE ISSUE 
Northwestern University is a private institution with its main campus 
in Evanston, Illinois.126 The university is a member of both the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and the Big Ten Conference (“Big 
Ten”).127 These organizations dictate the regulations under which the athletes 
compete, such as the maximum number of scholarships a school may award 
and the minimum academic requirements for athletes.128 Northwestern’s 
football team competes in the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”), 
which consists of approximately 125 institutions, only 17 of which are private 
colleges or universities, including Northwestern.129 Northwestern is the only 
private school in the 14-member Big Ten.130  
During the 2012–2013 academic year, the school’s football team 
consisted of 112 athletes, 85 of whom received a grant-in-aid scholarship 
valued at roughly $61,000 per academic year.131 This amount is based on 
tuition, fees, room, board, and books; the scholarship funds are directly 
applied to those expenses.132 Before receiving the grant-in-aid scholarship, 
each player receives a “tender” from the university specifying that the 
scholarship is subject to compliance with the policies and regulations of 
Northwestern, the NCAA, and the Big Ten.133 After accepting the 
scholarship, players are required to devote substantial hours to football 
activities, while simultaneously remaining full-time students.134  
                                                                                                             
 125. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
167, at *3–4 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
 126. Id. at *2.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
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Because these athletes are subject to such rigorous expectations, they 
believed that they were entitled to certain rights awarded to traditional 
employees. In January 2014, Ramogi Huma, president of the National 
College Players Association, filed a petition for representation in Region 
13 of the NLRB in Chicago on behalf of scholarship football players at 
Northwestern University who sought to form a collective bargaining unit 
under the NLRA.135 
A. Touchdown for the Players  
On March 26, 2014, the director of Region 13 of the NLRB held that 
the Northwestern scholarship football players were employees under 
section 2(3) and ordered an election to be conducted by all eligible 
players.136 Decided prior to the Board’s decision in Columbia University, 
the director held that the standard set forth in Brown University was not 
applicable to the scholarship athletes and instead employed common law 
principles.137 The director found that the scholarship players performed 
services for Northwestern under a contract of hire, subject to 
Northwestern’s control, in return for payment and therefore met the 
standard for employee status under section 2(3).138 
Accordingly, the director ordered an immediate election to be 
conducted by all eligible scholarship football players.139 By allowing 
players a seat at the bargaining table for the first time, the decision had the 
potential to change the landscape of college football. Under the regional 
director’s decision, scholarship athletes were given coverage under the 
National Labor Relations Act and consequently all of the rights afforded 
to employees under section 7.  
B. Northwestern Throws the Challenge Flag  
On April 24, 2014, the Board granted Northwestern’s request for review 
of the regional director’s decision, finding that it “raise[d] substantial issues 
                                                                                                             
 135. See Farrey, supra note 4. 
 136. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *7. Players deemed 
eligible to vote in the election were all football players receiving football grant-
in-aid scholarships that had not yet exhausted their playing eligibility at 
Northwestern University. Id. 
 137. Id. at *13. 
 138. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the application of the common law 
test to scholarship college athletes see infra Part.IV.B.3.  
 139. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *23. 
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warranting review.”140 The Board invited the parties and any interested 
amici to address the issues raised in the case, specifically requesting that the 
parties and amici address certain issues that it deemed central to the case.141 
First, the Board inquired as to the appropriate standard for determining 
whether the scholarship players are employees under the Act and the 
proper result applying that standard to the scholarship players.142 Second, 
the Board asked whether Brown University was applicable to the case and 
whether the Board should adhere to, modify, or overrule Brown.143 Parties 
were also invited to raise any policy considerations relevant to the 
determination of the players’ status under the Act.144 Finally, assuming 
that the scholarship players were employees under the Act, the Board 
questioned whether it should consider the existence of “outside 
constraints” that would alter the players’ ability to collectively bargain.145 
C. After Further Review 
Almost 18 months after Northwestern appealed the regional director’s 
decision, the Board announced its much-anticipated ruling.146 A decision 
affirming the regional director would have profound ramifications on 
college football and would verify what many had been arguing for years—
that college athletes are employees of their respective universities. 
Alternatively, a reversal would render a significant blow to the campaign 
for athletes’ rights in the ever-evolving world of college football.  
In a unanimous decision, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over 
the Northwestern scholarship football players, contending that a decision 
on the merits “would not effectuate the policies of the Act.”147 The Board 
                                                                                                             
 140. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
167 (Apr. 24, 2014) (order). 
 141. See Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 167 (May 24, 2014) (notice and inv. to file briefs). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. The Board also asked for feedback on an alternative in which it 
would recognize the scholarship athletes as employees, but preclude them from 
being represented in any bargaining unit, similar to the exception the Board has 
made for confidential employees. Id. 
 146. See Farrey, supra note 4.  
 147. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 
at *1, *3 (Aug. 17, 2015) (“After carefully considering the arguments of the parties 
and interested amici, we find that it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to 
assert jurisdiction in this case, even if we assume, without deciding, that the grant-
in-aid scholarship players are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3).”).  
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emphasized the nature and control exercised by sports leagues—here, the 
NCAA and the Big Ten—over individual teams.148 Further, the structure 
of FBS football, which is overwhelmingly composed of public institutions, 
meant that the Board’s decision would apply only to a small minority of 
teams competing in the relevant market.149  
Given the novelty of the players’ petition, the Board was unsure of the 
standard to apply to the athletes, since the players “d[id] not fit into any 
analytical framework that the Board ha[d] used in cases involving other 
types of students or athletes.”150 In this regard, the Board distinguished the 
scholarship football players, whose football activities were unrelated to 
their educational endeavors, from the graduate students in Brown and New 
York University.151  
The Board declined to consider the college athletes as conventional 
professional athletes in undisputedly professional leagues, given the 
additional academic requirements and NCAA regulations placed on the 
players.152 Moreover, even if the Board were to consider college athletes 
as analogous to professionals for purposes of collective bargaining, the 
Board had never been faced with a bargaining unit consisting of a single 
team’s players competing against teams completely outside of the Board’s 
jurisdiction.153  
The Board also addressed characteristics of college football, specifically, 
the FBS, which made it unlikely that a decision on the merits would promote 
labor stability.154 The Board indicated that the “symbiotic relationship” 
between FBS universities and the NCAA meant that conducting college 
football games requires direct interaction between the various institutions.155 
From this highly interdependent relationship among the FBS teams and the 
NCAA, the Board envisioned a ripple effect that its decision would have 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. at *3. 
 149. See id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. See id. at *3–4, *3 n.10 (“The fact that the scholarship players are students 
who are also athletes receiving a scholarship to participate in what has 
traditionally been regarded as an extracurricular activity (albeit a nationally 
prominent and extraordinarily lucrative one for many universities, conferences, 
and the NCAA) materially sets them apart from the Board’s student precedent.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 152. See id. at *4.  
 153. See id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
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throughout the FBS.156 Given the high degree of association required of 
member universities, labor issues involving only one team would likely 
affect other teams, making it unlikely that a Board decision on the 
Northwestern players’ case would promote labor stability.157  
The Board also determined that the structure of FBS football made it 
difficult for the Board to promote stability.158 Because the Board’s 
jurisdiction is limited to private institutions, a decision on the merits would 
affect only a small fraction of the schools competing in FBS football,159 
unlike any of the Board’s prior decisions involving professional sports.160 
Since Northwestern is the only private institution in the Big Ten, the Board 
would be unable to assert jurisdiction over the school’s primary 
competitors.161 This inconsistency could lead to circumstances in which 
schools that directly compete against each other are governed by 
inconsistent laws, as some states permit collective bargaining by public 
employees and others prohibit or limit it.162 The Board concluded that a 
decision on the merits in the context of this case would lead to an “inherent 
asymmetry” not present in other cases in which the Board had asserted 
jurisdiction.163 Therefore, to assert jurisdiction would not promote stability 
in labor relations.164  
Although a decision on the merits was not reached, the Board insisted 
that its decision was limited to the facts in this particular case.165 The 
Board declined to address the potential for another set of facts meeting the 
jurisdictional requirement of promoting labor stability; specifically, a 
                                                                                                             
 156. See id. at *4–5 (“Many terms applied to one team therefore would likely 
have ramifications for other teams.”). 
 157. Id. at *5.  
 158. See id. 
 159. As of October 2015, the FBS consists of 128 member schools, 17 of which 
are private institutions that are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. See NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N, http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/sponsorship 
?sortOrder=0&division=1A&sport=MFB [https://perma.cc/2CZJ-9TFD] (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2016). 
 160. See Northwestern. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 167, at *5 (“This too is a situation without precedent because in all of our past 
cases involving professional sports, the Board was able to regulate all, or at least 
most, of the teams in the relevant league or association.”). 
 161. The Board provides two examples in which state law specifically restricts 
scholarship athletes from being labeled “employees” for labor law purposes. See id. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. See id. at *1 (“Our decision today is limited to the grant-in-aid scholarship 
football players covered by the petition in this particular case . . . .”).  
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petition brought by football players at all 17 private colleges and 
universities in the FBS.166 So, as the saying goes, when the National Labor 
Relations Board closes a door, it leaves every other door and window in 
the house open and forgets to set the alarm.  
IV. RETURNING THE PUNT  
By punting in the Northwestern case, the Board declined to resolve the 
issue of college athletes’ status under the NLRA. Still, the Board was 
careful to leave the issue open for future groups of athletes to petition for 
representation. Arguably, some hypothetical group of college athletes 
exists that could compel the Board to assert jurisdiction. Based on this 
possibility, this Comment proposes a two-part solution for the Board to 
resolve the issues surrounding the employment status of college athletes. 
First, the Board should employ its reasoning in cases like Trustees of 
Columbia University and New York University and apply the common law 
test to college athletes, as well as graduate students. Second, after 
recognizing the employee status of these individuals, the Board should 
create a separate category of employees composed of scholarship college 
athletes that meet the definition of “employee” under the Act. 
A. Apply the Common Law Test to Both College Athletes and Graduate 
Students 
As the Board noted in Columbia University, the nature of the modern 
academic setting, as well as the plain language of the NLRA, has rendered the 
“primarily student” standard applied by the Board in cases like Adelphi 
University and Brown University no longer viable.167 Largely for the reasons 
set forth by the dissent in Brown University and the majority in Columbia 
University, the Board should apply the common law definition of “employee” 
to college athletes.168 Application of the common law master-servant standard 
leads to the conclusion that these scholarship athletes are in fact employees 
under the Act. 
                                                                                                             
 166. Id. at *6.  
 167. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 
483 (2004). 
 168. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 483. 
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1. Contemporary Academic Reality 
The landscape of colleges and universities is much different than when 
the Board first considered the status of graduate students under the Act.169 The 
academic setting has taken on a different role for many students, operating as 
both a workplace and an educational environment.170 Therefore, it is no longer 
practical to perceive colleges and universities as predominantly academic, and 
thus exclude students from coverage under the NLRA.171  
One commentator has discussed the conversion of the academic 
landscape, considering the development of student bargaining units, and the 
dissenting members in Brown University quoted him at length.172 This 
transformation has resulted in individuals who were once unquestionably 
students taking on the duties once devoted to tenured professors.173 By 
restricting individuals who perform similar functions as traditional employees 
of the university simply because they also happen to be students, the Board 
took an arcane viewpoint of the educational institution that is no longer the 
norm of present-day higher education. In Columbia University, the Board 
updated its approach and now embraces this contemporary role of educational 
institutions, at least as it applies to graduate students.174 
2. Clear Statutory Language  
In Brown University, the majority excluded graduate students based on 
the fact that their relationship with the university was “primarily 
educational.”175 In Columbia University, the Board held that excluding 
individuals from coverage under the Act purely based on their simultaneous 
status as students is inconsistent with the broad interpretation of section 2(3) 
that both the Board and the Supreme Court have adhered to for decades.176 
For the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, an employee is “any 
                                                                                                             
 169. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 497. 
 170. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *4 (Aug. 23, 2016).  
 171. See, e.g., The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974). 
 172. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 498 (quoting Daniel J. Julius & Patricia 
J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization: Catalysts and Consequences, 26 
REV. HIGHER EDUC. 187, 191, 196 (2002)).  
 173. Daniel J. Julius & Patricia J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization: 
Catalysts and Consequences, 26 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 187, 191, 197 (2002).  
 174. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90.  
 175. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487. 
 176. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *4–6; see also 
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984); Seattle Opera Ass’n, 331 N.L.R.B. 1072 (2000).  
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employee” not specifically excluded by Congress in section 2(3).177 The Act 
does not exclude statutory employees on the basis that their employment 
relationship is not the principal relationship with their employer, and 
accordingly, the Board is restricted from unilaterally making such 
exclusions.178  
In NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., the Supreme Court found 
that the broad interpretation of the Act’s definition of employee seemed to 
echo the scope of the ordinary dictionary definition.179 In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
NLRB, the Court found the scope of section 2(3) “striking” and “squarely 
appl[ying] to ‘any employee’” with the exception of the specific exclusions 
listed in the Act.180 The Board has followed the Court’s interpretation and 
given a broad reading of the definition of employee.181 In Sundland 
Construction Co., the Board reiterated that the statute applied in the absence 
of express exclusion.182 Because the Act does not expressly exclude college 
athletes, and because the Board now recognizes that graduate students can 
be employees under the Act, the Board should adhere to the plain language 
of section 2(3), which reflects the common law master-servant relationship.  
B. Under the Common Law, Scholarship Athletes Are Employees 
Commentators have applied the common law master-servant test to 
college athletes and have almost invariably found that scholarship athletes 
are employees under the common law.183 In Northwestern University, the 
                                                                                                             
 177. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).  
 178. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *6 (“The 
fundamental error of the Brown University Board was to frame the issue of 
statutory coverage not in terms of the existence of an employment relationship, 
but rather on whether some other relationship between the employee and the 
employer is the primary one [...].”); see also Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 496 
(“Absent compelling indications of Congressional intent, the Board simply is not 
free to create an exclusion from the Act’s coverage for a category of workers who 
meet the literal statutory definition of employees.”).  
 179. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 90 (quoting the dictionary 
definition of employee as including “any person who works for another in return 
for financial or other compensation”). 
 180. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 891. 
 181. See, e.g., Sundland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1226 (1992). 
 182. Id. (“Under the well settled principle of statutory construction—expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius—only these enumerated classifications are excluded 
from the definition of ‘employee.’”).  
 183. See, e.g., Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth 
of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 
97–117 (2006) (finding that certain college athletes meet the common law 
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regional director explained that, “[u]nder the common law definition, an 
employee is a person who performs services for another under a contract of 
hire, subject to another’s control or right of control, and in return for 
payment.”184 Applying this definition to scholarship athletes in revenue-
generating sports at FBS institutions yields the conclusion that these 
individuals are employees under the common law: they perform services for 
the obvious benefit of their university under an agreement setting forth their 
responsibilities and compensation and are subject to the control of their 
coaches and the university virtually every day while they are employed by 
the school.185 
1. The Players Perform Services for their Respective Universities 
From 2003 to 2012, Northwestern’s football program generated 
revenues of approximately $235 million through ticket sales, television 
contracts, merchandise sales, and licensing agreements.186 During the 
2012–2013 academic year, the football program generated approximately 
$30 million in revenue, while incurring close to $22 million in expenses.187 
That revenue was derived from ticket sales, Big Ten broadcast contracts, 
stadium rights, and merchandise sales.188 The substantial revenue and 
profits that FBS universities generally collect from fielding a football team 
demonstrates that scholarship athletes clearly provide services for the 
benefit of their university. 
2. The Daily Lives of Scholarship Athletes Are Subject to Strict 
Control of the University 
The degree of control that FBS universities exercise over scholarship 
athletes is also detailed in the regional director’s opinion in the 
                                                                                                             
standard for “employee”); see also William B. Gould IV et al., Full Court Press: 
Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. 
REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that scholarship college football players are under the 
control of the universities and therefore meet the common law definition of 
employee). 
 184. Northwestern Univ. & College Athletes Players Association, No. 13-RC-
121359, 2014 WL 1246914, at *12 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), review granted, 
362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Apr. 24, 2014) (order). 
 185. See id. at *14.  
 186. Id. at *11 (also finding that the university incurred $159 million in 
expenses during this period, for a profit of approximately $76 million).  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
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Northwestern case.189 One could argue that the athletes are subject to more 
control by their universities than any other “traditional” employees of the 
university, such as faculty members or student library workers. For 
instance, the players at Northwestern begin training camp approximately 
six weeks prior to the start of the academic year.190 From that point until 
the end of the football season, the players are required to attend anywhere 
from 40 to 60 hours of football-related duties per week and are usually 
provided with daily itineraries from the coaching staff.191  
In addition to football-related activities, the coaches have control over 
nearly every other aspect of the players’ private lives through various rules 
and regulations, which the players must follow under threat of discipline 
and loss of scholarship.192 In just one illustration of such exacting control, 
players are required to remain within a six-hour radius of campus, even 
during discretionary weeks, and must submit travel information to their 
coaches before departing.193 Commentators have found that scholarship 
athletes at other FBS institutions are subject to largely similar standards as 
the players at Northwestern.194 Based on the facts established in the 
Northwestern football players’ case, one would be hard-pressed to find 
any other individual on campus whose living arrangements, travel plans, 
and general day-to-day activities are so closely monitored by university 
officials.  
3. The Athletes’ Grant-in-Aid Functions as Compensation 
The grant-in-aid scholarship is provided to the players in return for 
their athletic services and acts as compensation provided by the university-
employer. The regional director in Northwestern University found that the 
players typically received approximately $61,000 in scholarship aid per 
academic year.195 On top of that, upperclassmen electing to live off-
campus were provided a monthly stipend between $1,200 and $1,600 to 
                                                                                                             
 189. Id. at *15–17. 
 190. Id. at *13.  
 191. See id. at *13–14 (detailing the daily itineraries provided to the players, 
“which set forth, hour by hour, what football related activities the players are to 
engage in from as early as 5:45 a.m. until 10:30 p.m.”).  
 192. See id. at *14.  
 193. See id. at *4, *14. 
 194. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 183, at 109 (surveying 
scholarship athletes from multiple FBS institutions and determining that the 
players are subject to strict control by their universities, similar to the regional 
director’s finding in Northwestern). 
 195. Northwestern Univ., 2014 WL 1246914, at *2. 
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cover their living expenses.196 Although the grants-in-aid are not provided 
in the traditional form of a paycheck, the scholarship money nonetheless 
constitutes substantial economic benefit for the players.197  
Scholars have debated whether the athletic scholarship acts as a form 
of compensation that meets the common law requirement.198 At least one 
commentator has compared the grant-in-aid scholarship to a contract of 
employment, as the terms of the scholarship set forth the obligations of the 
athletes and define the resulting economic compensation to be provided.199 
Recent litigation in the Ninth Circuit representing the campaign for the 
payment of college athletes could also result in major changes to the 
structure of college athletics.200 Finally, the fact that the grant-in-aid 
scholarships are renewable one-year athletic scholarships, rather than 
guaranteed for four years, establishes the quid-pro-quo nature of this 
compensation.201 The valuable services provided by these individuals and 
the unquestioned control exercised by the coaches and universities, 
coupled with the compensatory nature of the athletic scholarship, strongly 
indicates that scholarship college athletes meet the common law master-
servant test, as applied by the National Labor Relations Board. 
C. Modernization of the “Employee” 
The Board declined to rule on the status of the Northwestern players 
because any decision would only apply to a small fraction of the relevant 
labor market.202 The Board’s concern is a legitimate one because the 
granting of employee status to college athletes would allow the athletes to 
form unions and collectively bargain with their universities over any 
number of issues. 
1. Collective Bargaining is Not Suited for College Athletics 
There are several compelling reasons to preclude college athletes from 
joining collective bargaining units. As the Board emphasized, granting 
                                                                                                             
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at *12. 
 198. See McCormick & McCormick, supra, note 183, at 108–11. 
 199. See id. at 108–09; see also Northwestern Univ., 2014 WL 1246914, at 
*13 (detailing the tender offer received and signed by the scholarship athletes 
when committing to Northwestern).  
 200. See Samuel M. Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 201. Northwestern Univ., 2014 WL 1246914, at *14. 
 202. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
167, at *5 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
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college athletes the right to unionize and collectively bargain would put 
them at an extraordinary advantage compared to their counterparts at 
public universities in states where athletes are expressly excluded under 
state labor law.203 Moreover, college athletes, by definition, are employees 
of their university only so long as they remain in college—the maximum 
period that a player could be a member of the union is five years, with 
many scholarship players leaving much sooner.204 At the very least, the 
union would experience a 100% turnover rate in membership every five 
years. This high turnover rate does not lend itself to collective bargaining, 
as the demands of union membership could theoretically change every 
year. Finally, the composition of college football teams in general makes 
it difficult for any collective bargaining unit to represent the players 
effectively. The NCAA limits FBS institutions to 85 scholarship players 
per team.205 However, teams will often field “walk-on” players who do not 
receive athletic scholarships, but are nonetheless held to largely similar 
standards as the scholarship athletes.206 It is not uncommon for these walk-
on players to receive substantial playing time alongside scholarship 
players.207 Because walk-ons do not receive athletic scholarships, they do 
not receive compensation for their services and would not meet the 
common law standard for employees. Consequently, any bargaining unit 
consisting of college athletes would necessarily exclude walk-ons, who 
are intimately connected to union members and who would likely be 
affected by union activities. For these reasons, allowing college athletes to 
join bargaining units and collectively bargain with their universities would 
not effectuate the policies of the NLRA.  
However, to contend that these individuals are not at all engaged in an 
employment relationship with their universities would be to turn a blind 
                                                                                                             
 203. Id. at *5–6 (addressing the variance in federal labor law governing 
Northwestern University compared to state labor law of Ohio and Michigan, 
which controls public institutions in direct competition with Northwestern).  
 204. Dennis Dodd, Near-Disastrous Number of Early Entries Declaring for 2016 
NFL Draft, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball 
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eye to the state of present-day college athletics. As outlined above, 
scholarship athletes in revenue-generating sports meet the common law 
definition of employee as applied by the NLRB and the Supreme Court.208 
Withholding protection under the NLRA from these individuals would 
effectively strip them of their rights as employees. College athletes should 
not be penalized for the nature of their labor market. Instead of taking an 
“all or nothing” approach to section 7 rights, the Board should recognize 
a middle ground in which individuals determined to be employees are 
granted certain protections under the Act, even if they are precluded from 
joining labor unions and collectively bargaining with their employer.  
2. A New Group of Employees  
College athletes possess certain characteristics that distinguish them 
from traditional employees covered under the Act, making it difficult for 
the Board to recognize their status as employees.209 In light of these 
differences, college athletes should be isolated and incorporated into a 
separate category of employees. These athlete–employees would be given 
coverage under the NLRA; however, because of their unique position, 
athlete–employees would be restricted against forming bargaining units 
and engaging in collective bargaining with their universities. If athlete–
employees were barred from collective bargaining and union activities, 
then they would not be given an advantage over their opponents at public 
universities, concerns over high turnover among the employees would be 
extinguished, and scholarship athletes would not be treated substantially 
different than their teammates who are not on scholarship. This constraint 
would thus circumvent many of the Board’s policy concerns over granting 
NLRA coverage to college athletes.210 
Although restricted from collective bargaining, athlete–employees 
would possess the remaining rights granted by section 7—specifically, the 
protection of concerted activity for mutual aid and protection.211 This right 
would protect athlete–employees against discharge and other retaliatory 
                                                                                                             
 208. See supra Part.IV.B. 
 209. See supra Part.IV.C.1 (arguing against unionization of college athletes). 
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actions for activities such as work stoppages,212 walkouts,213 strikes,214 and 
protests over working conditions.215 Under this proposal, athlete–
employees would be in a better position to protect themselves as statutory 
employees, while simultaneously avoiding policy concerns of allowing 
college athletes to collectively bargain.  
There are some additional considerations arising from this proposed 
solution. First, one must consider whether the NLRB even has the 
authority to make such a change. Then, if the NLRB does have the 
authority, one must consider by what mechanism this change would be 
carried out. Because the National Labor Relations Board is an independent 
agency created by Congress, administrative law will generally govern any 
action taken by the Board.216 An administrative agency is generally given 
broad discretion when reasonably interpreting its own enabling statute.217 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the 
Supreme Court provided a two-step approach to an agency’s interpretation 
of its enabling statute.218 First, the reviewing court should determine 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”219 
                                                                                                             
 212. See Halstead Metal Prods. v. NLRB, 940 F.2d 66, 70 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(finding employees who collectively refuse to work in protest over wages, hours, 
or other working conditions are engaged in concerted activities for mutual aid or 
protection within meaning of the NLRA and are protected from retaliatory actions 
taken by employers for participation in or instigation of such activity). 
 213. See Charge Card Ass’n v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1981) (“A 
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1979) (finding work stoppages in protest of working conditions, even by 
unorganized employees, are protected activities); see also Vic Tanny Inter., Inc. 
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accepted if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.”). 
 218. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 219. Id. 
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Then, if the enabling statute’s language is unambiguous, the agency must 
defer to Congress. However, Congress has a history of granting agencies 
interpretive leeway by writing relatively ambiguous enabling statutes. 
Under Chevron, if Congress is unclear in its intent, an agency is allowed 
to essentially fill in the gaps of its own enabling statute.220 If it is 
determined that Congress was either silent or unclear, the reviewing court 
will then determine whether the agency’s mandate is reasonable.221 If so, 
the court must defer to the agency’s action.  
Because this proposal requires an interpretation of the NLRA by the 
Board, any action taken by the NLRB will be reviewed in light of 
Chevron.222 It could be argued that Congress was unambiguous in section 
7 where it identified the rights that all employees “shall have” under the 
Act.223 Further, the use of the conjunctive “and” supports the inference that 
Congress intended to provide an individual with all of the rights listed in 
section 7, provided that the individual was found to be an employee.224 If 
a court were to determine that Congress was unambiguous in section 7, 
this solution would require a congressional amendment to the NLRA.225 
However, if a court found that section 7 was unclear on whether the rights 
could be divided and parsed, as this solution proposes, then the Board 
would be given broad deference to take reasonable steps to implement this 
solution, either through rulemaking or adjudication.226  
Opponents may also question the substantive influence of this 
proposal—specifically, whether this solution actually provides the 
athlete–employee with any rights of significance, considering that the 
primary benefit of the Act is meant to encourage collective bargaining.227 
Although a prominent benefit of employee protection under the NLRA is 
the right to self-organization and to collectively bargain, the protections 
established by this solution should not be discounted. By allowing athlete–
employees to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and 
protection, the Board would be providing these individuals with a right 
that they do not currently possess—the right to walk out. Although under 
the current structure athletes could conceivably unite for a collective 
cause, nothing protects these athletes from recourse for doing so. Under 
this proposal, an athlete’s scholarship and position on the team would be 
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protected if he or she were to engage in these types of protected, concerted 
activities under the Act.  
CONCLUSION 
The growth of college athletics has necessitated a modernization of 
the understanding of the rights granted to individuals under the NLRA. To 
safeguard the rights of college athletes while continuing to promote the 
policies of the Act, either the Board or Congress must take steps toward 
reform. Instead of taking an all or nothing approach where college athletes 
are excluded based on the perceived problems with imposing collective 
bargaining on college athletics, the Board should take a more practical 
approach. Whether by administrative procedures or, if necessary, 
legislative amendment, the Board should recognize that scholarship 
college athletes are employees under the National Labor Relations Act and 
should tailor the section 7 rights of employees to fit the labor market of 
college football. If the industry of college football is to continue on its 
exceptional trajectory, it must adapt to the unique environment in which it 
exists, beginning with how it recognizes scholarship student-athletes. 
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